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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
NATHAN SEAMONS as the surviv-
ing partner of SEAMONS & LOVE· 
LAND. 
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant. 
-vs-
LARRY D. ANDERSON and 
HANS P. ANDERSON. 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and RICHARD PETERSON, 
Defendant. Counter-Claimant, 
Cross-Claimant, Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant. 
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and 
RAY BITTERS, Co-Partners, doing 
business in the firm name and style 
of VALLEY CAR MARKET, 
Defendants and Cross-
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANTS AND 
APPELLANTS 
ANDERSONS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
Case No. 7691 
Appeal from the District Court of Cache County, Utah 
Honorable Lewis Jones, District Judg-e 
Geo. D. Preston 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
" 
NATHAN SEAMONS as the sur-riv-
ing partner of SEAMONS & LOVE-
LAND. 
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, 
-vs-
LARRY D. ANDERSON and 
HANS P. ANDERSON. 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and RICHARD PETERSON, 
Defendant, Counter-Claimant, 
Cross-Claimant, Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and 
RAY BITTERS. Co-Partners. doing 
business in the firm name and style 
of VALLEY CAR MARKET, 
Defendants and Cross-
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANTS AND 
APPELLANTS 
ANDERSONS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
Case No. 7691 
STATEME'JY1l OF FACTS 
The ?\Iercury car 'va~ repossessed from appellants on 
~ray 2:3, 1949 hy· \T alle:v Car ).f arket and turned to the 
l)(>ssPssion of plaintiff on August 15, 1949 (R. 2), and 
plainti l'f held pos~P~sion tlH1 reof until commencement 
of tlH• aetion until at h~ast December 11, 1950 (R. 152). 
liP did not conunence the actjon until April 17, 1950 
(~P(• filing date on baek of complaint R. 3). 
':Ph<' plainti l'f h:· his original co1nplaint sought to 
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2 
foreclose a mortgage (R. 3), but it cannot be ascertained 
whether he was preceding under 104-55-1 DCA, 1943, 
or under Title 13, UCA, 1943. His first amended com-
plaint sounding in declaratory judgment was abandoned, 
• 
and then his second amended complaint appears to re-
vert to the foreclosure theory in equity (R. 40). 
ARGUMENT - POINT ONE 
The plaintiff cannot recover against appellants in 
any event. If he proceeded as in case of real property 
foreclosure he is barred by Chapter 55, l;CA, 1943, be-
cause he must have judgment before seizure, deficiency 
judgment after execution and sheriff's sale, and is also 
barred by 13-0-10, UCA, 1943 because he failed to make 
a sale within 30 days after seizure. 
He is barred from forecloseure by advertisement 
because he failed to give notice of the sale, 13-0-8, UCA, 
1943. 
Suppose he had sold the car within 30 days after 
seizure. I-Ie asked judgment against appellants in the 
sum of $1648.06 (R. 4), and it was worth between 
$1700.00 and $1800.00 (R. 141). The jur~T so found, and 
plaintiff has not appealed fro1n. this finding. 
Plaintiff now contends this to be a chattel n1ortgage. 
I-Ie cites a case on page 5 of his brief. This 'vas on min-
ing property· a:nd real property providing for execution 
of a deed. Ours 'vas a conditional sales agreement anrl 
is so called through a1J of the plPadings of plaintiff. 
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Plaintiff states on page 6 of his brief that he sold the 
paper to Commercial Credit Company. The forms were 
furnished by the Co1npany. 
The character of the instrument is fixed by the in-
tention of the parties to it at the time of it's execution. 
14 C. J. S. p. 578, par. 3, 
... ''the character of the transaction is fixed at 
its inception, and if an instrument is a mortgage 
'vhen executed its character does not afterward 
change, for once a mortgage always a mortgage, 
is a maxim of law." 
It is a surprise to us that counsel does not know the 
common ordinary 1neaning of a mortgage. If Ander-
son had borrowed money from Valley or plaintiff, and 
executed the docun1ent in question, then it could have 
been a n1ortgage regardless of the form of it. But, he 
bought a car, and the document merely represented the 
halance of the unpaid purchase price. The question here 
presented was set at rest in the lTtah case of Campbell 
vs. Peter (1945), 162 P. 2d 754 overruling a former case, 
and approving the case of Stillman v. Lynch, (Utah) 
192 P. 272. The Lynch case stated flatly, saying: 
"As we read the statutes of Utah, a title re-
taining note is neither in fact nor in law a chat-
tel 1nortgage. It has none of the characteristics, 
indicia, or elements of a chattel mortgage, except 
that of security". (See other Utah cases therein 
cited.) 
... \ long- linP of ~" nnotations appear in A. Ij. R. term-
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inating at 175 A. L. R. 1374. The distinction is well 
put by the annotator at page 1379, 
. . . ''it is not the office of a conditional bill of 
sale to secure a loan of m'Oney; its purpose ra-
ther is to permit an owner of personal property 
to make a bona fide sale on credit reserving title 
in himself, for security until the purchase price 
is fully paid." 
SUMMARY - Plaintiff cannot recover against ap-
pellants under any theory. If it is a conditional sales 
contract, the car was worth more when seized than the 
obligation. He treated it as his own property and not for 
security. It was held for nearly a year and a half be-
fore final sale, and it was driven 7000 miles. The 
foreclosure of a chattel mortgage must be accomplished 
strictly under the provisions of the statute, and this was 
not done. I have carefully and more fully briefed all 
points to the District Court, and desire to shorten this 
and save costs by referring thereto (R. 92). 
Respectfttlly subntitted 
GEO. D. PRESTON 
Attorney for Appellants 
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